先占取得的正當性缺陷及其法律規制

先占取得的正當性，既不緣於其在推動私有制起源方面的效率價值，也不能通過標的物的“無主”狀態自證，而是在於“為他人保留足夠多與同樣好”的分配正義承諾的可實現。在先占客體由財富“流”向財富“源”上溯的背景下，因在實證法中無法有效形成對正當佔有的辨別機制，而無法確保實現先占取得的正當性。這令效率追求難以為繼，引發對古典先占及其所創造財產秩序的系統反思與制度改造，並形成在不可有物的憲法上所有權控制下的，可有物在部門法上的類型化分享路徑。先占取得在民法中的制度保留並不當然處於“國不與民爭利”及“法無禁止即自由”的私法保障範圍內。自由先占模式僅對為滿足生存需要的先占取得適用，超出這一限度的先占需通過先占權模式實現。相對於自始無主物，對嗣後無主物的先占取得因不涉及先占人對財富源的壟斷風險，可在符合環保與資源再生利用原則的條件下適用自由先占模式。

The legitimacy of acquisition through first possession originates from neither its efficiency value in promoting the development of private ownership, nor the“no-owner”state of subject matter. Rather, it comes from the realization of the distributive justice promise of“conserving adequate and good resources for others”. When backtracking from the “flow” to the “source” of wealth, the legitimacy of first possession cannot be ensured due to the lack of proof in the positive law. This causes the failure of efficiency pursuit, triggering a systematic reflection and institutional transformation of the classical first possession and the property order created by it, forming assorted regulating routines: res extra nostrum patrimonium regulated by the Constitution, res in nostro patrimonio by individual laws. The acquision through first poessions rule in civil law is not completely justified by rules of “the state does not compete with the people for profits” or “everything is doable without legal prohibition”. Only the first possession aiming at satisfying survival need is free, and anything beyond this limitation should resort to rules of first possession right. Compared to the res quae nullius in bonis sunt, because of the lack of source monopolyrisk, the first possession of res derelictae is free as long as being consistent with principles of environmental protection and resource recycling.