財產性判項與減刑假釋的聯動機制

為解決刑事案件中財產性判項執行難的問題，最高人民法院在全國正式推行服刑人員生效財產性判項履行與其減刑假釋裁定相關聯的聯動機制改革。實踐中聯動機制作為一種激勵機制正向激勵不足，負向激勵被片面強調或放大，成為一種懲罰模式。在這一模式下，聯動機制相關主體之間並不存在共同的利益基礎。在保護受害人群體和法院整體利益的目標驅動下，有財產性判項犯罪人的利益普遍受損，由於資訊甄別方面的低效，聯動機制還導致利益受損犯罪人的範圍不當擴大。犯罪人群體由此產生的消極反應進而損害了監獄的重大利益。同時，作為個體的受害人和基層法院法官並不因為聯動機制必然獲益。利益分配不均帶來的成本與內耗降低了聯動機制運行的整體效率。雖然聯動機制在提高財產性判項執行率方面取得了一定效果，但是為此付出的代價卻可能是巨大的。出於提高整體社會福利的考慮，最高人民法院在推行聯動機制改革的過程中需要審慎為之。

The Supreme People's Court recently endeavors to establish a mechanism linking fulfillment of monetary sanctions, which suffers difficulty nationwide, with commutation and parole. However, the negative incentive resulted from the mechanism outweighs the positive, leading to the defacto aggravated punishment for criminals in judicial practice. Under the mechanism, the benefits for victims and courts are at the cost of criminals obliged to monetary sanctions, as well as prisons, which face growing difficulty in managing these criminals dissatisfied with the poor distinguishing of the mechanism. Thus, the overall efficiency of the mechanism has been greatly affected due to the lack of mutual interests among the relevant stakeholders. The improvement infulfillment of monetary sanction, though in process, is limited and at the bigger cost of some stakeholders. In conclusion, the Supreme People's Court shall further improve the mechanism linking fulfillment of monetary sanctions with commutation and parolemore cautiously, in light of the whole society's welfare.