家族企業的監督水準與績效關聯性

The Relation between Monitoring for Family Firm and Performance

最適的監督水準係指邊際的監督利益等於邊際的監督成本，換言之，若超過最適監督水準後，監督機制的效益反而會下降。因此，本文作者探討家族企業的監督水準與公司績效間的關聯性，並進一步探討下列特質之影響：家族成員股權偏離程度、家族成員是否同時擔任董事長及總經理、和家族企業無相關的其他機構法人持股比率。實證結果發現，若家族企業搭配較低的監督水準，則公司會計績效及市場績效都有提升效果。此外，若家族成員股權偏離程度越大，則需要搭配越高的監督水準，此時公司績效較好；反之，若家族成員同時兼任董事長及總經理亦或是和家族企業無相關的其他機構法人持股比率較高，則搭配較低的監督水準，公司績效較好。 The optimal level of monitoring means that the marginal benefits of monitoring are equal to the marginal costs of monitoring. In other words, the benefits of the monitoring mechanism will decline if the level of monitoring exceed the optimal level of it. Therefore, this research investigates the relation between monitoring level of family firm and company performance, and further to examine the moderating effects of items, which are: separation of control and cash flow rights; CEO duality; percentage of institutional ownership not affiliated with family firm. The empirical results show that if the monitoring level for family firm is weaker, the company's accounting performance and market performance will be enhanced. In addition, if the separation of control and cash flow rights is greater and the monitoring level for family firm is stronger, then the company's performance will be better. On the contrary, if the CEO duality exists in the family firm, or the percentage of institutional ownership not affiliated with family firm is higher, and the monitoring level for family firm is weaker, then the company's performance will be better.