土地使用審議組織之委託代理關係分析－－以內政部區域計畫委員會為例

An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Relationship in the Land Development Examination Organization - Taking the Ministry of the Interior Regional Planning Committee as an Example

本文從新制度經濟學觀點探討政府內部所廣泛設置之審議組織其成員間委託人與代理人之關係對於審查過程之決策影響。利用文獻分析、專家深度訪談法與實地觀察法來收集所需資料，再透過以內政部區域計畫委員會為例，探討審議組織委託人與代理人之關係，以瞭解其於土地使用之關鍵性。本文結論為應釐清委託人與代理人之權責、減少會議次數以提昇代理人之代理品質、建立監督機制，並適度提昇激勵誘因、信息提供不應誘導代理人之審查方向、委託人與代理人意見紛歧案件應予不許可處分。 This article considers from 'The New Institutional Economics' viewpoint, inside the government's widespread, established decision-making process and the effect of the influence between the trustees and the agents regarding the examination process. Taking the Ministry of the Interior Regional Planning Committee as the example, this article will organize the relationship between the trustee and the agent by analysis of the literature and in-depth interviews to understand its crucial nature to land development. This article recommends clearly defining power and responsibility, reducing conferences to promote a proxy attribute between the trustee and the agent, and establishing a supervising mechanism. This article also moderates promotion drive causes, provided the information should not induce examination of direction, and should not approve cases on which the trustee and the agent have divergent opinions.

This article considers from 'The New Institutional Economics' viewpoint, inside the government's widespread, established decision-making process and the effect of the influence between the trustees and the agents regarding the examination process. Taking the Ministry of the Interior Regional Planning Committee as the example, this article will organize the relationship between the trustee and the agent by analysis of the literature and in-depth interviews to understand its crucial nature to land development. This article recommends clearly defining power and responsibility, reducing conferences to promote a proxy attribute between the trustee and the agent, and establishing a supervising mechanism. This article also moderates promotion drive causes, provided the information should not induce examination of direction, and should not approve cases on which the trustee and the agent have divergent opinions.