捷運建設制度及其補助模式之代理問題分析

The analysis of Principal-Agent Problems in the Subsidization Modes of MRT Construction Institutions

國內許多制度均係由中央制定，再委由地方政府執行，政府內部的組織活動形成一種多重任務委託代理關係，雙方都是在有限理性與訊息不對稱之情形下進行決策，因此容易產生「逆向選擇」與「道德危機」等代理問題，職是之故，如何透過激勵機制與契約安排，將政策執行者之自利動機與政策制定者之財政目標結合，乃成為中央政府制定政策時之考量重點。本文旨在探討國內捷運建設制度及其補助模式自民國75年行政院核定台北捷運初期路網迄今，由「中央補助、地方興建營運」轉向「民間投資、民間營運」，再回歸「中央設定補助門檻、地方整合開發建設」之政策發展歷程，從公共選擇觀點闡釋中央與地方政府間之委託代理關係，並因應不同制度安排所衍生之代理問題內涵，提出於滿足契約理論所揭櫫之「參與約束」與「誘因相容」原則下，所對應之激勵機制設計構想，期為國內捷運建設營運之永續發展提供政策建言。 Due to the activities inside the governmental organism are a series of multi-task principal/agent relationship, most public policies are made under the condition of ”bounded rationality” and ”information asymmetry”, so the ”adverse selection” and ”moral hazard” problems are easily occurred in this principal-agent relationship of institutional design and execution processes. Consequently, how to generate the strategies which combine the self-interest motivations of policy executant with the financial purposes of policy designer, in order to establish the appropriate incentive mechanism and institutional arrangement for local governments, will be the main concern while the central government adopts a policy. This paper tries to discuss the institutional changes and subsidization modes of Taiwan's MRT systems since the Executive Yuan approved the Taipei Metropolitan MRT system first stage network in 1986. The structure of the institutions has been changed from ”central government subsidized/local governments constructed and operated” to ”BOT scheme”, and finally turned to ”central government sets up subsidiary threshold/local governments combine MRT project with land development”. Beside to explain the principal-agent relations between central and local governments from the viewpoint of public choice theory, this paper also tries to study the incentive mechanism concepts in order to deal with the principal-agent problems of different institutions under the ”participation constraint” and ”incentive compatibility” principles in contract theory.

Due to the activities inside the governmental organism are a series of multi-task principal/agent relationship, most public policies are made under the condition of ”bounded rationality” and ”information asymmetry”, so the ”adverse selection” and ”moral hazard” problems are easily occurred in this principal-agent relationship of institutional design and execution processes. Consequently, how to generate the strategies which combine the self-interest motivations of policy executant with the financial purposes of policy designer, in order to establish the appropriate incentive mechanism and institutional arrangement for local governments, will be the main concern while the central government adopts a policy. This paper tries to discuss the institutional changes and subsidization modes of Taiwan's MRT systems since the Executive Yuan approved the Taipei Metropolitan MRT system first stage network in 1986. The structure of the institutions has been changed from ”central government subsidized/local governments constructed and operated” to ”BOT scheme”, and finally turned to ”central government sets up subsidiary threshold/local governments combine MRT project with land development”. Beside to explain the principal-agent relations between central and local governments from the viewpoint of public choice theory, this paper also tries to study the incentive mechanism concepts in order to deal with the principal-agent problems of different institutions under the ”participation constraint” and ”incentive compatibility” principles in contract theory.