董監事暨重要職員責任保險對管理階層盈餘管理行為之影響

THE EFFECT OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR OF MANAGERS

本文以2008年至2010年台灣上市（櫃）公司為研究對象，探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險（簡稱D&O保險）與管理階層盈餘管理行為之關聯性。實證結果發現，相對於未購買D&O保險的公司，有購買D&O保險的公司，管理階層盈餘管理的幅度較大，而且進一步分析也發現，有購買D&O保險的公司，超額投保金額愈大，管理階層盈餘管理的幅度愈大。此外，本文實證結果亦發現，當管理階層操作盈餘增加時，有購買D&O保險的公司，會讓觀禮階層有較大的空間；然而，當管理階層操縱盈餘減少時，則未有穩健的證據支持購買D&O保險對管理階層盈餘管理的行為有明顯影響。

Using publicly-available D&O insurance data for public companies in Taiwan from 2008 to 2010, this study examines the effects of directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) on earnings management behavior of managers. The empirical results show that firms with D&O insurance have greater magnitude of discretionary accruals than those without D&O insurance. In addition, we also find that firms with higher abnormal D&O insurance coverage have greater magnitude of discretionary accruals. Furthermore, we find that there exists a positive relationship between D&O insurance and discretionary accruals in firms managing earnings upward. However, we find no significant evidence on the above-mentioned relationship for firms managing earnings downward.