董事暨重要職員責任險與併購宣告日被併公司之異常報酬的相關性研究

Does D&O Insurance Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth during M&As?

伴隨著企業舞弊案件的逐年增加，保障投資人權益的相關措施近年來也因此而吸引了學術與實務界的重視；其中董事暨重要職員責任險在諸多提升公司治理的機制中更是引起了廣泛的討論，其原因不外乎該類保險鞏固了投資人、董事與經理人的財富，並改善或移轉了經理人因訴訟賠償壓力下所可能造成的過度保守行為，但卻也可能同時衍生出道德危險的誘因，並進而給予了經理人在合法情況下剝奪股東或投資人權益的動機。透過分析2008至2010年共計129家國內被並之上市櫃企業於併購宣告日之異常報酬，本文發現已投保該類保險之被併企業，相較於事件中未投保的企業，明顯存在較低的宣告日累計異常報酬；在實證數據與顯著性並不敏感於樣本及變數的選取或衡量方式下，本文的發現凸顯了董事暨重要職員責任險的負面價值，並呼應了近期已沒國、中國及南韓等為研究樣本的實證結果；在責任險的利與弊得以釐清之際，各國推動企業揭露投保內容的政策似乎也存在著必要性與價值。

Following the increasing number of corporate wrongdoings, directors’ and officers’ liability (D&O) insurance, ideally designed to protect shareholder wealth, has attracted increasing attention from both scholars and practitioners. This insurance may enhance the function of the board and reduce conservatism. However, moral hazard problems may undermine the incentive for board monitoring and hence induce managers to pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholder wealth. Analyzing 129 listed firms announced to be acquired during the period from 2008 to 2010, the empirical findings indicate that target firms carrying D&O insurance tend to suffer lower cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Moreover, the difference remains significant when alternative approaches or subsamples are applied, suggesting that the cons of this D&O insurance seem to outweigh the pros. Since the findings provide international evidence on the role of D&O insurance, disclosure of the information on this insurance, advocated recently in several nations, is worthy of support.