董事會如何制定研發決策：資源依賴還是相互模仿？

How Does The Board Make R&D Investment Decision? Resource Dependence or Imitation?

本研究從兩個角度探討董事會連結對企業創新決策的影響，首先我們考慮董事會成員中董事會連結的比例，引用「資源依賴假說」及「董事忙碌假說」，提出兩個互斥觀點，探討董事會連結的現象是否足以豐富企業的資源，藉以催化了創新的基因，或者因為長袖善舞、無暇分身，反而短視近利而不願從事長期才看的到效果的創新投資。其次，我們透過企業配對的方式，思考具有連結董事的兩家公司是否會互相模仿對方的R&D決策，藉以驗證「連結董事的模仿效應」。研究樣本取自台灣證券交易所2009年到2013年之上市上櫃公司，財務資料取自台灣經濟新報（TEJ）。研究結果顯示：董事會連結比例越高，支持忙碌假說，對R&D決策有所傷害。此外，具有連結董事的配對企業則存在研發決策的模仿行為，研究結論可供政府相關單位進一步思考公司治理的政策涵義。

This paper investigates the effect of board interlock on corporate research & development (R&D) investment. The first part of the paper we propose two exclusive hypothesis (resource dependence hypothesis and director busyness hypothesis) to investigate the effect of board interlock on corporate R&D investment policy. If board interlocking stimulates R&D spending, then the conclusion supports resource dependence hypothesis; On the other hand, if board interlocking hampers R&D spending, then director busyness hypothesis holds. The second part of the paper, we argue that managers will imitate the R&D investment intensity of their interlocked-firms when deciding how much to spend in R&D for their own firm. Using a sample of public firms listed in Taiwanese Stock Exchanges, our empirical results show that the more board the less R&D spending, and managers imitate the prior R&D investment intensity of their interlock partners.