英文摘要 |
This article analyzes the change of the ratio of government bond dependency in Japan by political factors. Masaru Mabuchi examined the sharp rise in the rate of government bond dependency in the late 1970s under the influence of political institution, that is, the Ministry of Finance's jurisdiction over both the fiscal policy and the financial administration. However, the ratio of government bond issues to total government expenditures has increased sharply since the late 1990s—when the administrative authorities over fiscal and financial affairs were separated. At a glance, this sharp rise of the ratio cannot be fully attributed to political factors. Nevertheless, this article points that lowering long-term interest rates by the Bank of Japan, which was given legal independence from the government in 1998, has facilitated the large-scale government bond issues. Sometimes the Bank of Japan received pressure from the government and the Ministry of Finance and lowered long-term interest rates; at other times the Bank lowered them on its own initiative. This article also shows that the Prime Minister's office has forced the Bank of Japan to ease monetary policy aggressively during the second and third Abe Administration and that the large-scale monetary easing policy has facilitated large-scale government bond issues and harmed the fiscal discipline. The large-scale government bond issues since the late 1990s can also be attributed to political factors. |