交通資訊與路徑選擇：用路者之實驗賽局

Traffic Information and Route Choice: Experimental Games among Road Users

本研究應用賽局理論以實驗方式觀察用路者間互動下之路徑選擇行為，將管理策略視為外在因子，透過賽局實驗之反應進行資料蒐集，以分析交通資訊影響下用路者自我與其他用路者間雙玩家的非合作賽局之路徑選擇。本研究之工作內容歸納為兩部分：(1) 用路者行為特性與賽局傾向之前置分析，包括用路者特性、用路者間之互動行為及路徑使用特性；(2) 三階段連續十週計50工作日的動態控制賽局模擬實驗（實驗賽局），主要目的在於觀測與分析個體用路者在不同賽局提示元素資訊形式之實驗設計情境下互動的波動狀態，蒐集用路者行前與途中之逐日動態路徑決策資料。研究結果顯示，以實驗的方式可反應個體用路者與整體路網出象 (outcome) 的波動變化與漸趨於穩定現象，並可從賽局分群傾向分析賽局實驗結果，了解不同賽局傾向的個體用路者會有不同的賽局決策行為。如此，我們發現整體用路者互動最終狀態趨達到理論上之奈許均衡 (Nash Equilibrium)。

It is interesting to study the individual driver’s route choices under theinfluence of the route guidance information, where individual driver makes consecutive route switch decisions along the traveling route. An experimental gamein the form of controlled experiment was implemented to investigate dynamic routechoice games among users supplied with various degrees of explicit traffic androute guidance information. The experiment context includes two decisiondimensions: day-to-day pre-trip route choice and en-route decisions with a periodof ten consecutive working weeks (50 days) under various designated scenarios(sequences). As such, a three stage comprehensive controlled experiment has beenconducted where subjects were selected to participate in a series of laboratorysimulation as commuting drivers, while regarding traffic management asauthoritative. In addition the explicit game where evolution of the individual’s(player’s) consecutive decision and playoffs were recorded and analyzed, includingthe decision to decision dynamics and their final (convergence) state. As such, wefound that the final state approached the theoretical Nash Equilibrium.