管理人員責任保險是否影響公司多角化

Does Managerial Legal Liability Affect Firms’ Corporate Diversification?

本文檢測董監事及重要職員責任保險（D&O保險）對公司多角化及未來績效的影響。D&O保險能使管理人員承擔風險，因而減少公司的多角化；然而，D&O保險也會導致管理人員建立帝國企業的情況。故本文檢測是否D&O保險對多角化具有淨正向的效果。本文以685家購買D&O保險的上市（櫃）公司為研究對象，樣本期間為2008-2011年。實證結果發現超額D&O責任保險與公司多角化（特別是無關多角化）呈正向關聯性。此外，本文也發現超額D&O責任保險將惡化多角化對公司價值的影響。根據代理理論，D&O保險能使管理人員承擔風險，因而減少多角化的程度。然而，根據管理人員利益掠奪理論，D&O保險能豁免管理人員的法律責任，並促使管理人員藉由多角化來建立帝國企業。本文之實證結果與管理人員利益掠奪理論相一致，亦即，超額D&O責任保險導致管理人員追求企業版圖的擴張，特別是無關多角化的策略。此外，D&O保險所產生的公司多角化行為亦不利於股東的價值。本文的實證結果顯示，對於台灣企業而言，D&O保險會影響公司的多角化及未來績效。因此，D&O保險對於投資人在制定投資決策上為一有用之資訊。另外，本研究也對政策制定者在D&O保險的管制與相關揭露上提供了深入的了解。本研究結果證實超額的D&O保險對股東價值有淨負向的效果。

We examine the effect of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) on corporate diversification and subsequent firm performance. D&O insurance can encourage management to take risks and make less diversification, but it can also entrench management and lead to empire building. We test whether D&O insurance has a net positive effect on diversification. Using archival data from a sample of 685 Taiwanese companies that purchased D&O insurance between 2008 and 2011, we document that excessive D&O liability insurance is positively associated with corporate diversification, particularly unrelated diversification. In addition, we find that when diversification does occur, excessive D&O liability insurance worsens the shareholder value destroyed by corporate diversification. According to the agency theory, D&O insurance encourages risk taking and discourage corporate diversification. However, management entrenchment theory predicts that D&O insurance insulate managers from shareholder lawsuits and thus entrench them. Entrenched managers tend to pursue empire building activities like diversification. This study tests these two competing predictions. We find that evidence that is consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis. That is, excessive D&O liability insurance induces empire building, especially unrelated diversification. Furthermore, the induced corporate diversification hurts shareholder value. Our results show that, in the Taiwan context, D&O insurance affects diversification and subsequent performance. Therefore, D&O insurance is a useful piece of information to shareholders when they make investment decisions. In addition, this study offers insights to policy makers who are interested in regulating D&O insurance and its related disclosure. Our results suggest a net negative effect of excessive D&O insurance on shareholder value.