論投資爭議中國家安全問題的司法審查

The Judicial Review of National Security in Investment Disputes

外資並購國家安全審查與基於國家安全原因的外資管制措施均會對投資者權益帶來影響，而能否對此實行司法審查則是當前國際投資法尚未解決的問題。歐盟對此提供了一種解決方案：司法審查當中充分尊重成員國對國家安全的定義，但對實現“國家安全”目標的手段合法性設定清晰的法律標準。與之相對比，在ICSID爭端解決實踐當中，何為國家安全、能否提交司法審查，以及手段合法性的法律標準均不清晰，針對同一投資措施的五起案件甚至相互矛盾。除此之外，外資並購國家安全審查目前仍游離於司法審查之外。此狀況原因在於，歐盟法律能夠服務於多元目標，且歐洲法院具有構建區域法制體系的動力，而ICSID項下臨時仲裁庭並無上述意願。中國當前的雙邊締約實踐當中，外資管理的“國家安全”抗辯條款已經相當科學；同時，為服務於“負面清單”模式的外資准入改革，即便無法對國家安全進行定義，也至少應當列出負面清單，另外，還應對國家安全審查手段的合法性標準進行清晰的制度設計。

Both the national security review of foreign M&A and 'national security' exceptions negatively influence investors' rights, yet judicial review in that regard is still largely absent. The EU solution, while in full respect of member states' liberal definition of national security, adopts a very strict scrutiny against the means to this end. Comparatively, in ICSID cases, the definition of national security, availability of judicial review, and standard of legal means, vary. Five disputes arising from the same investment measure could even achieve different outcomes. While ECJ could focus on more goals than simply investment protection and has the motivation to contribute to better rule of law, ICSID had no such intention. Currently, China's BITs adopt a very recommendable draft of national security exception. It's advisable for future BITs to at least adopt the negativelist method and define the legality standard of the national security review when defining national security is impossible.