說服性廣告下藉由利潤分享契約所達成之通路調和

Channel Coordination by Profits-Sharing Contract for Advertisement

在既存有關說服性廣告之文獻幾乎都認為廣告在本質具有攻擊性、侵略性，亦即當某製造商推出說服性廣告後，其競爭對手的利潤定會受到損失。在通路上游存在兩個競爭之製造商，而這兩位製造商均透過一個零售商經銷他們的產品，且此通路為集權系統。在此通路架構下，過往已發表的文獻均指出當製造商推出說服性廣告時，該廣告必須鎖定高、中、低偏好的消費者群中的某一群體而不可以全體市場為訴求對象。若如此，再加上推出廣告之製造商在通路的談判權很低時，通路中三個廠商得利潤都會上升，進而達成通路協調之目標。廣告後對通路成員之利潤產生損益衝擊時，有一部分的利潤損益是各成員必須接受。而與談判權大小無關。惟有當通路由分權變成集權系統所創造的額外利潤才依成員之談判權的大小分配。若是如此，則說服性廣告無需所定特定目標，也與成員之談判權無關，單以利潤分享原則即足以達成通路協調之目標。

Almost all existing literature with regards to persuasive advertisement considers advertisement by nature to be offensive and invasive, that is after a certain manufacturer has launched a persuasive advertisement, the profits of its competitors will definitely suffer losses. The opinion does not have the Consistency, but is proven in this research. In addition, a centralized channel, evolving from a decentralized channel, in which two competing manufacturers sell their products through a retailer can reach coordination and this channel is also with Pareto efficiency by means of profits-sharing contract through the principle of bargaining power.