英文摘要 |
GFNPOs and NDPBs are considered quasi-governmental organizations in Taiwan. This paper begins with a broad introduction to "arm's-length", and discusses its local contexts. The findings are as follows. First, the strengthening of congressional oversights over GFNPOs and NDPBs is reasonable, while it is also important to maintain the balance between external accountability and autonomy. Second, presumably, the oversights over NDPBs should be more intensive then GFNPOs, and therefore the congressional budget reviews, the property declarations of board members, and the salary ceiling need to be re-examined. Third, to reinforce the internal accountability of GFNPOs and NDPBs, competent authorities should emphasize the importance of the boards and the improvements of boards' professional capacity. Fourth, this paper argues that the increases of informational transparency and internal auditing can enforce the self-discipline of these organizations. Finally, it is suggested that GFNPOs with higher publicness may be transformed to NDPBs. |