英文摘要 |
This paper aims to tackle the following three connected questions regarding nationalism in contemporary China: (1) What are the relations between official and popular nationalisms? How do we explain nationalism’s “take-off” after more than forty years of its “touch-down” in 1949? (2) The rise of the so-called “new nationalism” in the 1990s coincided with China’s increasing involvement in the globalization process; how can we explain this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon? (3) How can we make sense of strong emotions and abundant feelings that have been the characteristics of this wave of nationalism? Adopting a phenomenological approach, this study examines institutions, structures of feeling, as well as cognitive frames to answer the above questions. It is found that Chinese nationalism was not “tentatively absent” after 1949; rather, it was transformed into “polity-based nationalism” and functioned as “banal nationalism” in daily routines. Communism and nationalism are neither mutually exclusive nor substitutive; instead, they are implicated with each other in a much subtler way. The “war communism” during Mao’s period has constructed a new kind of subject, namely, the “people” [renmin] forged by the “frames of war/frames of struggle” of the united fronts. The structures of feeling, as well as the cognitive frames (namely, frames of war), of such new subjects, reproduced through official patriotic education and daily practice, have been framing the worldview of a majority of people even up until today. This also explains why popular nationalism arises and the rhetoric of war is frequently observed in this so-called global era. Last but not the least, this paper argues that feelings and emotions should not be dismissed as merely “irrational factors” to be excluded from our analysis. On the contrary, structures of feeling, which have profoundly shaped nationalists’ value and their worldviews, have provided us an important key to the understanding of contemporary Chinese nationalism. |