薪酬委員會之設置及其品質對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響

The Effect of the Establishment and the Quality of Compensation Committee on Top Executives' Pay-Performance Sensitivity

本研究旨在探討薪酬委員會之設置及其品質是否能有效提升高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效間的連結程度（即薪酬績效敏感性）。以2009~2012年之台灣上市公司為研究樣本，實證結果支持薪酬委員會的設置能有效增進前述兩者間之正向關係，且在以2012年設置薪酬委員會後之公司來檢驗薪酬委員會品質對薪酬績效敏感性之影響後，更進一步發現薪酬委員會品質愈佳，愈能提升高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性。整體而言，本研究發現薪酬委員會的一些特性（如出席狀況、忙碌程度、任期及規模等）對治理品質的提升具有實質助益，故委員會成員的特質屬性，將主導該委員會品質之優劣。換言之，薪酬委員會是否能發揮其提升薪酬績效敏感性的預期效果，端視其組成成員之特性。

This study examines whether the establishment of compensation committees and the governance quality of the committees improve the association between top executives' cash compensation and accounting performance (i.e., pay-performance sensitivity). Using a sample of Taiwanese-listed firms over the period spanning 2009-2012, the empirical results support our argument that the establishment of compensation committees has a positive effect on pay-performance sensitivity. We also find that, after the mandatory establishment of compensation committees in 2012, the positive association between top executives' cash compensation and accounting earnings is more pronounced when the quality of compensation committees is high. Overall, our findings indicate that several characteristics of compensation committee quality (e.g., attendance, multiple directorships, members' tenure and committee size) have a significant impact on corporate governance mechanisms. In summary, the role of compensation committees in improving pay-performance sensitivity depends on specific characteristics of its committee members.