The Relationship between R&D Capitalization and Subsequent R&D Investment Decisions: the Monitoring Role of the Board of Directors

研發資本化與研發投資效率之關聯性研究：兼論董事會之監督角色

研發資本化的支持者一向認為，研發支出費用化將誘發短視的管理者藉由削減研發費用，以操縱短期利潤，導致研發投資不足的現象。然而，本研究認為研發資本化並非萬靈丹。使用2007年至2010年美國軟體業公司為樣本，本研究為首篇利用大樣本執行實證研究，提供證據指出研發資本化將導致後續研發之過度投資。此證據支持下列觀點：選擇研發支出資本化的管理者，基於聲譽考量，即使研發方案已經前景黯淡，寧願繼續投資也不願意報導研發資產減損，進而導致研發過度投資。此外，本研究進一步分析發現，有效的董事會監督可抑制前述管理者研發投資過度的行為。

Proponents of the R&D capitalization method have long argued that expensing R&D incentivizes myopic managers to cut R&D to manage short-term profits, leading to underinvestment in R&D. However, we argue that R&D capitalization is not a panacea. Using a sample of U.S. software firms from 2007 to 2010, we document the first archival empirical evidence that R&D capitalization can lead to subsequent over-investment in R&D. This finding is consistent with the view that, to save their reputation, managers of R&D capitalizing firms are reluctant to report impairment of capitalized R&D. Consequently, capitalizing firms tend to continue those R&D projects with bleak prospects and thus over-invest in R&D. A further analysis indicates that effective monitoring from a firm's board of directors can discipline managers for overinvestment in R&D.