美中強權政治的悲劇宿命？米夏摩理論的探析

The Doomed Tragedy of Sino-US Great Power Politics? A Reflection on Mearsheimer's Theory

從1990年代初期兩岸政府重啟談判協商以來，彼此之間的談判互動已出現愈來愈頻繁的現象。雖然兩岸至今在主權上仍存有爭議，但在其他議題的協商上，卻也出現日漸增多的趨勢。為了理解兩岸談判中的複雜性，本文嘗試在Putnam「雙層賽局」（two-level game）的基礎之上，增列國家決策者個人認知因素（decision-maker cognitive factors）以擴展其分析框架，並依據戰略三角理論將兩岸談判區分成六個時期，以討論個別時期之間的差異。研究發現，在把個人認知因素結合談判曲線，形成從國際、國內到個人層次的動態分析途徑，更能解釋兩岸談判的發展歷程及其議題連結（issue linkage）的談判特性。

In the early 1990s, cross Taiwan Strait governments reopened the gate of negotiation. Since then, the debate of sovereignty still remains between the two sides, but the number of issues that both sides have continuously negotiated has increased. In order to understand the complication of cross-strait negotiations, we extend Putnam's two-level game framework to include cognitive factors of national decision-makers. This paper also intends to divide cross-strait negotiations into six periods on the basis of the strategic triangle theory, and distinguish differences among periods. The paper finds that cognitive factors combined with the negotiation curve shapes the dynamic approach from an international and domestic level to an individual level analysis. It has more explanatory power to explain the differences among six periods to understand the development of cross-strait negotiations. This paper also can distinguish the characteristics of issue linkage negotiations more easily.