動態的臺海兩岸談判：雙層賽局與認知因素研究

Changing Negotiations between the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait - Two-Level Game and Cognitive Factors Approaches

本文以34個半總統制的民主國家做為分析案例，時間範圍涵蓋1945至2012年，使用事件史分析，來探討總統單邊任命權和免除權，對於總理任期產生的影響。研究發現，單邊任命權對於總理任期的影響方向，取決於總統是否擁有免除權，亦即單邊任命權和免除權，對於總理任期有交互作用的影響。在總理總統制下，總統的單邊任命權會增加總理下台的風險；反之，在總統國會制下，單邊任命權可以降低總理下台的風險。造成單邊任命權和免除權出現交互作用的原因，可能是總統可以利用單邊任命權，選擇自己偏好的人選，進一步造成總理和國會之間互動方式的改變，進而影響總理任期的長短。這個研究發現，除了可以解釋總統單邊任命權的影響外，還可以解釋先前學界對於總統任命和免除總理職務的爭論。

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of presidential appointment power and presidential dismissal power which affects the duration of the term of the prime minister under semi-presidentialism. We use event-history analysis to estimate the different factors that impact the prime minister's duration. The range of time used is from 1945 to 2012 and includes 34 democratic semi-presidentialism countries. We find that the effect of presidential appointment power depends on dismissal power, that is, appointment and dismissal power have an interactive effect with the duration of the prime minister. In premier-presidential systems, if the prime minister was ultimately appointed by president, the hazard of a prime minister termination will increase; and it will decrease when the president can appoint the prime minister in a president -parliamentary system. Because a president can choose anyone he or she wants to be prime minister by appointment power, further, the relationship of president, prime minister and parliament will be changed. This discovery can explain the effect and controversy of presidential appointment and dismissal power.