併購交易之審查──從Presidio案看企業併購法修正草案

The Review for M&A Transactions: Comments on Draft Amendment of Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act from Presidio

本文以介紹德拉瓦州衡平法院之Presidio案為契機，探討該案於德拉瓦州案例法之意義，並由此反思2020年10月企業併購法修正草案之規定，以及我國應如何確立併購交易審查機制等問題。在Presidio案中，德拉瓦州衡平法院指明在與控制股東不存有利益衝突的場合中，外部股東多數決具有將審查標準調整為經營判斷法則之作用，且若前提要件未獲滿足，所適用者為強化審查標準，並就主張受託義務違反而尋求事後救濟之場合，說明法院將就個別被告逐一進行審查，僅在各個被告違反忠實義務或注意義務時，始生個人責任。我國在前開企業併購法修正草案中，擬增加董事及10％股東對於其他股東之資訊揭露事項。然草案增加之資訊揭露項目與併購交易協商過程無涉，股東無從瞭解其中過程，亦無法藉此評估是否接受董事所達成之併購交易。更重要的是，草案規定所得賦予股東之救濟，乃爭執董事會及股東會之效力，但併購交易有損股東權益之緣由，未必皆可見於董事會及股東會之召集程序、表決方法及決議內容，而有必要將審查之焦點，自董事會及股東會之進行，轉移至對併購交易之整體過程。除了實體法上之建構，本文認為商業事件審理法所創設之審理計畫及當事人查詢制度，若能有效運用，將有助於訴訟程序之迅速進行，並緩和股東之證據偏在劣勢。

By introducing the Presidio opinion by the Delaware Court of Chancery, this article not only analyzes its implication in the context of Delaware case law but also comments on the draft amendment of Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act dated October, 2020 as well as on the review mechanism of M&A deals under Taiwan law. In Presidio, the Delaware Court of Chancery indicates that in the absence of the conflict of interests with controlling shareholders, the approval of the majority of the unaffiliated shareholders will change the standard of reviews to the business judgment rule; if the conditions of the valid approval of the majority of the unaffiliated shareholders are not satisfied, then the standard of reviews will be enhanced scrupulously. In addition, the court will decide each defendant is liable for monetary compensation only when such defendant breaches the duty of loyalty or duty of care. The said draft amendment of the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act aims to impose disclosure obligation on the director and 10% shareholder. However, the newly added items to be disclosed has nothing to do with the deal process of M&A, so the shareholder could not judge whether to approve such deal. Furthermore, the remedy available for the violation of the above disclosure obligation is to allow the shareholder to challenge the validity of the shareholder resolution and board resolution, which may prevent certain defects during the deal process of M&A from being scrutinized. Thus, this article argues that the review of M&A transactions should shift the focus to the whole deal process of M&A and constructs the review mechanism accordingly. In addition to the construction under the substantive doctrine, the article also indicates that the procedural measures, provided by the newly effective Commercial Case Adjudication Act, would allow the shareholder to pursue the remedy effectively and quickly and ease the shareholder's disadvantage in evidence.