| 英文摘要 |
This thesis focuses on Taiwan’s limited company system, examining its shortcomings from the perspective of shareholder rights protection and proposing specific amendments. Limited companies, as the most prevalent corporate form under Taiwan’s company law, account for more than 75% of all companies, underscoring their significance. However, the current company law provides only 15 articles for limited companies, compared to the detailed regulations for corporations and publicly traded companies. This relative simplicity leads to insufficient shareholder rights protection, particularly in addressing shareholder equity imbalances and implementing corporate governance mechanisms. Accordingly, this study centers on the protection of shareholder rights in limited companies, combining domestic and international literature, theoretical analysis, comparative law, and practical case studies to comprehensively examine and evaluate Taiwan’s limited company system. Firstly, this study reviews the historical development of the limited company system. Since its inclusion in Taiwan’s company law in 1946, the limited company system has undergone several significant amendments in 1980, 2001, 2009, and 2018, which adjusted shareholder number restrictions, capital requirements, and oversight rights. However, these amendments have failed to fundamentally resolve structural issues in corporate governance and shareholder rights protection, particularly in safeguarding the interests of minority shareholders and providing effective remedies. Secondly, the study analyzes the main issues in shareholder rights protection under the current legal framework, including the exercise of shareholder oversight rights, the pursuit of director liability, voting rights design, and remedies for defective resolutions. Regarding oversight rights, while the current law grants non-executive shareholders the right to oversee company operations, it lacks clear regulations on the scope and mechanisms for exercising these rights, leading to potential misuse or limitations in practice. In terms of director liability, while limited company shareholders can initiate legal actions, the procedures and implementation are insufficient, with a particular lack of effective mechanisms to hold directors accountable for illegal acts. Regarding voting rights design and remedies for defective resolutions, the close-knit nature of limited company shareholders often results in voting rights configurations that suppress minority shareholders. Additionally, remedies for defective resolutions are unclear, leaving shareholder interests inadequately protected. To address these issues, this study examines the experiences of Germany, the United States, and China in their limited company legal systems. Chapter Five proposes the construction of a comprehensive legal framework for protecting shareholder rights in limited companies, focusing on both substantive and procedural aspects. The goal is to establish a more robust legal framework for shareholder rights protection in limited companies. Through these reforms, it is anticipated that the fairness and transparency of Taiwan’s limited company legal system will be enhanced, fostering sustainable development for small and medium-sized enterprises and strengthening Taiwan’s business environment. In summary, as a crucial component of Taiwan’s company law, the legal design of limited companies directly affects the operational efficiency of small and medium-sized enterprises and the level of shareholder rights protection. By analyzing the historical evolution of limited companies, identifying current systemic issues, and leveraging the advantages of comparative law, this study presents a practical reform plan to contribute to the improvement of Taiwan’s limited company system and its legal framework. |