作為少數保護之國會調查權——以德國基本法中少數監督權作為我國立法之借鏡

Congressional’s Investigatory Powers as A Protection of Legislative Minority: A Concurrent Analysis on the Structural Dilemma of Taiwan Legislative Yuan’s Investigative Power and Power to Access Documents

我國國會法上調查權向來不彰，主因即係其發動必須院會或委員會過半決議為之，然在多數執政之下，即難以為之。此一結構性困境看似起因於民主體制中多數決原則，實則蘊含著代議制度下多數決原則與少數保障間的緊張關係、國會調查權何以不彰的重大問題，如何透過國會法制的制度設計以平衡兩者，即為本文所為之目的。

The investigatory power of Taiwan’s legislature has been ineffective. The main reason is that the exercise of the power requires support by a majority of votes at the Legislative Yuan Sittings or Legislative Yuan Committee. However, it is difficult to obtain the support when the majority party in the parliament also controls the executive branch. This structural dilemma seems to arise from the majority rule principle of democracy as it actually shows the tension between the majority rule and minority protection that exists in representative democracy. This article aims to analyze the reason why congress’s investigatory powers is ineffective and how to balance the majority rule and minority protection by designing the legislature’s legal system.