英文摘要 |
Humanitarian intervention originated from the philosophical and theological discussion on ‘just war’. According to this view, to prevent abusive and unjust governance of a state, the recourse to force by other states against it is morally permissible. This thesis attempts to outline the definition of humanitarian intervention by analysing the pertinent academic literature. In brief, this research suggests that the contemporary concept of humanitarian intervention can be defined as the recourse to force to prevent gross and systematic human rights violations. In addition to the motives of suppressing such abuses, military intervention is only permissible when the intervening parties reasonably believe that no other peaceful resort is effective in achieving the goal. Furthermore, this thesis suggests that article 2(4) and 2(7) of the United Nations Charter do not necessarily illegalise humanitarian intervention. Be that as it may, what remains unclear is whether this concept finds justification according to the express stipulations, such as article 51 and 56 of the Charter. After reviewing the current academic debate, the author contends that none of these articles provides a solid legal basis for such kind of intervention. There have also been discussions on whether humanitarian intervention has been recognised as part of customary international law. Concerning this issue, this research argues that the answer is in the positive under the conditions where (1) the intervening party comprises multiple states; (2) the intervention aims to halt an ‘ongoing’ human rights violation and is non-anticipatory; and (3) the intervention launched is to prevent ‘genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes’. |