自檢視公司法第178條規範析論股東利益衝突之解決模式

An Analysis of Section 178 of Taiwan Company Act and Alternating Mechanisms to Deal with Shareholders’Conflicts of Interest

股東遇股東會議案有自身利害關係致有害公司利益之虞時，公司法第178條（以下稱「本條」）禁止其行使表決權，避免其因私害公。但本條構成要件相當抽象，執行上易衍生爭議，又缺乏股東自身利害關係資訊提供之配套，致使本條實際發揮作用甚為有限。另法院對違反本條之認定與效果亦有分歧意見，使本條規範實益令人質疑。此外，倘大股東或控制股東對有自身利害關係議案皆應迴避，反使公司意思由少數股東決定，似有違股份有限公司之資合性質。在此些疑慮下，本文建議刪除本條，另重新思考規範解決股東之利益衝突關係。尤其在有大股東或控制股東主導的併購交易，股東之利益衝突關係甚為明顯，應有特別規範之必要。本文擬以參考國外法制規範作為借鏡，再衡酌本國法制環境後，提出本文見解與未來修法建議，期能藉本文拋磚引玉，對我國公司治理法制進步略盡綿薄貢獻。

According to Section 178 of Taiwan Company Act (the Section), a shareholder who has a personal interest in the matter under discussion at a meeting, which may impair the interest of the company, shall abstain from voting. However, there is a doubt that the Section can function as expected in practice due to the vague languages used in the elements and no any mechanism to disclose conflicts of interest for the company and its shareholders to identify who will be interested. Furthermore, courts’ opinions split on how to apply the Section, which makes the Section unforeseeable and difficult to be complied with. It also raises a question whether the minority shareholders, instead of big shareholders or controlling shareholders who are not allowed to vote, could appropriately make fundamental decisions on behalf of the company and all shareholders as a whole. In conclusion, this Article suggests that the Section be deleted and Taiwan Company Act reconsider a new mode of regulations to deal with the conflict of interest issues involving shareholders. After surveying various institutions in foreign jurisdictions and taking the characteristics of our legal system into account, this Article concludes by proposing some recommendations for future legal reform.