從巴赫汀學圈對佛洛伊德主義的批判論「對話論」另解：以變性敘事為例

Reviving an alternative approach to “dialogue” from the Bakhtin Circle’s critique of Freudianism: The case of transsexual narratives

本研究旨在從巴赫汀學圈對於佛洛伊德主義的批判，推敲「對話論」的另條解釋路徑與應用性，亦即心理—衝突模式的對話。首先，透過對Freudianism: A Critical Sketch一書進行理論回顧與批判閱讀，本研究將指出Bakhtin針對精神分析恐懼歷史、去意識化的評述雖揭櫫「對話論」的社會—互動性和互為主體性，卻恐難以擺脫某種決定論的結構主義觀。有鑑於此，Bakhtin「行為意識形態」的觀點則有助於重拾對主體內在話語與自我意識的強調。在此，維繫「我—經驗」在本體論上不同於「我們—經驗」的物質性並非本質主義，而是從「自我與他者的對話」轉向「自我與自我的關係」，並推敲後者所體現的心理—衝突如何凝聚其無法「轉化為」外在話語的語藝處境或困境。變性敘事得適切地說明此理論模式。

 

This study aims to revive an alternative approach to theorize “dialogue” from the Bakhtin Circle’s critique of Freudianism and elaborates that how the psychic-conflictual model of dialogue can be employed to analyze transsexual narratives. The study begins by providing a theoretical review and critical reading on Freudianism: A Critical Sketch by Vološinov. Although Bakhtin criticized Freudianism as having the tendencies of “distrust of consciousness” and “fear of history” and emphasized the importance of social interaction and intersubjectivity in the theory of dialogue, Bakhtin’s theories, paradoxically, cannot escape from the trap of deterministic structuralism. In light of this, the study argues that Bakhtin’s idea of “behavior ideology” is useful in re-examining the emphasis on the inner speech and self-consciousness of the subject. Here, the ontological materiality that makes the “I-experience” different from the “We-experience” is never an endorsement of essentialism. It is a shift from “the dialogue of self and other” to “the intrapersonal dialogue.” The study shows the rhetorical situation or predicament of how the inner speech of subject cannot successfully “turn into” outward speech and elaborates on how in the case of transsexual narratives this will be re-problematized and analyzed with the psychic-conflictual model.