英文摘要 |
With the concentration of shares into institutional investors, proxy advisors start to play a significant role in corporate governance, providing voting recommendations that would sway voting decisions by shareholders with significant shareholding. However, the operation of proxy advisors is arguably controversial. In the US, commentators concern that the quality of proxy advisors’ voting recommendations would be affected by lack of manpower, untransparent process to forge voting recommendations, concentration of the proxy advisory market, robot-voting and conflict of interest. To response, the US SEC amends Regulation 14A in 2020 to regulate proxy advisors. In Taiwan, the Financial Supervisory Commission adopts the Roadmap of Corporate Governance 3.0, which plans to expand the stewardship business and establish the communication mechanism between proxy advisors and listing companies. This article explores the operation and comments on proxy advisors in the US and the amendment of Regulation 14A in 2020. Based on such exploration, this article further comments on the relevant planning stipulated in the Roadmap of Corporate Governance 3.0.
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