策略性企業社會責任與進口關稅政策

Strategic Social Responsibility and Import Tariff Policy

本文建立一個三國兩廠商的進出口模型，以探討當兩出口廠商採取策略性CSR時，進口國的最適進口關稅政策及相關的福利效果。本文發現：（i）當進口國採取單一關稅時，兩出口廠商的策略性CSR隨著兩出口品的替代程度提高呈先遞減後遞增；當進口國採取差別關稅時，兩出口廠商的策略性CSR隨著兩出口品的替代程度遞減，而且當兩出口產品的替代性較小（大）時，單一關稅下的策略性CSR程度小（大）於差別關稅。（ii）當兩出口廠商採取策略性CSR時，兩出口產品的替代性較小（大）時，進口國會採取差別（單一）關稅，此結果與文獻的結果截然不同。

This research uses an exporting model à la Brander and Spencer (1985) to examine optimal tariff policies for the importing country and the associated welfares when the exporting firms engage in strategic consumer-oriented CSR activities. We find, the optimal degree of strategic CSR is convex under a uniform tariff and decreasing under a discriminatory tariff in the substitutability between the exporting goods. When the exporting goods’ degree of substitutability is low (high), the optimal CSR level under discriminatory tariff is higher (lower) than that under uniform tariff, and thus the importing country prefers a discriminatory (uniform) tariff. This runs in sharp contrast to the results of previous literature.