| 英文摘要 |
This study investigates how board capital—the aggregated ability of outside directors—enhances corporate governance effectiveness following the implementation of 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Using S&P 1500 firms from 2006-2020, we examine governance outcomes before and after SOX and during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The results show that firms with higher board capital rely less on equity-based compensation, engage less in earnings management, exhibit stronger performance turnover sensitivity, and sustain long-term investments. These findings support the substitution hypothesis, suggesting that capable boards directly perform monitoring functions traditionally achieved through incentive mechanisms. Moreover, during the financial crisis, high-capital boards reinforce oversight and stabilize corporate investment behavior. Overall, our evidence conceptualizes board capital as a conditional governance asset—its effectiveness is activated under institutional reforms or crises—substituting incentive pay, constraining managerial opportunism, and sustaining firms’long-term strategic orientation. |