| 英文摘要 |
Taiwan occupies a critical node in the Indo-Pacific region and serves as a major convergence point for global submarine cable networks. As gray zone threats continue to intensify, submarine cable security has increasingly become a central concern for national defense and communications resilience. At least nine cable severance incidents were recorded in the first three quarters of 2025, reflecting the normalization of deliberate infrastructure disruption as a coercive instrument below the threshold of armed conflict. This article employs documentary research and comparative analysis to examine three international frameworks as legislative reference models: Australia's submarine cable protection zone regime, NATO's military surveillance measures, and the European Union's Submarine Cable Security Action Plan, which structures its approach around five operational pillars—prevention, detection, response, recovery, and deterrence. These frameworks collectively offer a comprehensive architecture for strengthening Taiwan's legal and institutional capacity to protect critical undersea infrastructure. Although the Executive Yuan introduced the ''Seven Cable Laws'' amendment package in September 2025, significant legislative gaps remain unaddressed. Specifically, five deficiencies have been identified: first, unclear application standards for national security aggravated offense provisions; second, inadequate ex ante preventive mechanisms; third, incomplete early-warning surveillance systems for high-risk vessels; fourth, ambiguous jurisdictional basis for extraterritorial enforcement; and fifth, the absence of institutionalized international cooperation mechanisms. To address these gaps, this article proposes a three-tier defense framework: ex ante prevention through integrated surveillance systems and intelligence sharing; in situ monitoring through enhanced identification and control of high-risk vessels; and ex post deterrence through severe penalties and inter-agency coordination to ensure enforcement consistency. On the international dimension, the article recommends institutionalized cooperation across three tracks—Taiwan-EU intelligence sharing, Indo-Pacific joint monitoring mechanisms, and modernization of applicable international legal norms. These measures should be complemented by the Legislative Yuan's adopted resolution requiring the Ministry of the Interior to publish submarine cable and pipeline mapping data to facilitate public awareness and enforcement. Only through such a comprehensive and coordinated approach can Taiwan effectively counter gray zone threats and safeguard its critical infrastructure security. |