| 英文摘要 |
Ex-ante competition regulation has, in recent years, emerged as a pivotal regulatory response to the impact of the rise of large digital platforms on market competition. Following the implementation of the European Union’s pioneering Digital Markets Act (DMA), the European Commission has, to date, designated 23 core platform services provided by seven major technology undertakings as“gatekeepers.”With respect to the enforcement of statutory obligations under the DMA, the Commission may adopt“specification proceedings”to clarify the compliance measures that designated undertakings are required to implement. Where an undertaking fails to comply with such requirements within six months of designation, the Commission may initiate“non-compliance investigations”and impose sanctions upon a finding of infringement. This article provides a detailed analysis of currently observable cases involving regulatory specification, non-compliance investigations, and enforcement penalties, and further examines their subsequent implications and potential developments. As a novel regulatory framework without prior precedent, the DMA offers several advantages, including enhanced timeliness of intervention, increased legal certainty, and reduced enforcement costs in competition law. However, it also entails potential adverse effects, such as possible negative impacts on the EU economy and the risk that undertakings may strategically exploit the DMA framework to engage in anti-competitive conduct. The findings of this study indicate that two key issues will determine the medium- to long-term effectiveness of the DMA. First, whether it can adequately respond to the rapidly evolving dynamics of the digital economy; and second, whether it can effectively contribute to fostering competitive domestic platforms within Europe. In light of these issues, this article further identifies underlying concerns regarding the future trajectory of EU regulatory development. The DMA’s extraterritorial impact on non-EU undertakings and its influence on other jurisdictions also constitute important indicators for observation. This article argues that U.S. technology giants—currently the primary targets of DMA regulation—may, in fact, ultimately become its principal beneficiaries. Moreover, although several jurisdictions have already introduced ex-ante competition regulatory regimes inspired by the DMA, it remains uncertain whether the DMA will achieve widespread global success comparable to that of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Given the significant variations in the development of digital economies and platform markets across jurisdictions, it remains an open and critical question whether—and how—countries, while drawing inspiration from the EU model, will develop ex ante competition regulatory frameworks tailored to their own specific needs. |