庭外重組的邏輯重構與制度實現──兼論困境企業市場化拯救的協同機制研究

Logical Reconstruction and Institutional Implementation of Out-of-Court Restructuring—A Study on the Collaborative Mechanisms for the Market-Oriented Rescue of Distressed Enterprises

困境企業拯救機制的現代化轉型，是衡量一國營商環境成熟度與司法文明程度的關鍵標尺。在《中華人民共和國企業破產法》迎來重大修訂的窗口期，庭外重組作為市場化拯救的「第一道防線」，正面臨新一輪的實踐創新。本文立足於「庭外重組」背後的交易成本、契約不完全理論與博弈邏輯的分析框架，對庭外重組的制度本質進行了深度解構。同時，針對中國大陸當前實踐中存在的「程序泛化」與「司法父愛主義」傾向，分析「私人秩序」與「公共治理」的邊界，以避免高昂的制度性成本與資源配置的錯位。在此基礎上進一步提出，庭外重組的制度內核應定位於事前治理與關係契約的載體，其核心功能在於透過降低間接破產成本來保全企業的營運價值。針對困擾實踐的「鉗制問題」，提出應將預重整嚴格界定為連接「市場自治」與「司法強制」的制度接口，而非獨立的第三程序。同時，透過對包括美國、英國以及亞洲部分國家的制度比較研究，主張應建構包含信義義務標準的資訊揭露體系、基於異議債權人保護機制，以及以「表決豁免」為核心的程序銜接規則。最終，嘗試提出《企業破產法》修訂草案的具體條文建議，旨在確立「市場主導協商、司法托底確認」的二元協同治理體系，在效率與公平中實現困境企業拯救。

The modernization of distressed enterprise rescue mechanisms serves as a key benchmark for gauging a jurisdiction’s business environment maturity and the advancement of its judicial civilization. Against the backdrop of the ongoing comprehensive revision of Mainland China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, out-of-court restructuring—the ''first line of defense'' for market-oriented enterprise rescue—is undergoing a new round of practical innovation. Drawing on an analytical framework integrating transaction cost theory, incomplete contract theory, and the game-theoretic logic underlying out-of-court restructuring, this paper conducts an in-depth deconstruction of the institutional essence of the mechanism. It also addresses the prevailing tendencies toward procedural overreach and judicial paternalism in current Mainland Chinese practice, delineating the boundary between private ordering and public governance to forestall excessive institutional costs and resource misallocation.
Building on this analysis, the paper posits that the institutional core of out-of-court restructuring should be positioned as a vehicle for ex ante governance and relational contracting, with its primary function being the preservation of debtors’going-concern value by reducing indirect bankruptcy costs. To resolve the holdout problem that has long plagued practice, the paper proposes strictly defining pre-restructuring as an institutional interface bridging market autonomy and judicial coercion, rather than treating it as a standalone third procedure. Through a comparative study of relevant regimes in the United States, the United Kingdom, and select Asian jurisdictions, the paper advocates for establishing an information disclosure regime anchored to fiduciary duty standards, a protection mechanism for dissenting creditors, and procedural coordination rules centered on voting exemptions.
Finally, the paper puts forward concrete draft articles for the ongoing revision of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, with the aim of instituting a dual-track coordinated governance framework characterized by market-led negotiation and judicial confirmation as the ultimate safeguard, so as to achieve optimal distressed enterprise rescue that balances efficiency and equity.