| 英文摘要 |
The formal connotation of the presumption of innocence primarily focuses on the mechanism of proof, embodying the fundamental characteristics of formal rule of law and democratic human rights. However, this formal dimension fails to keep pace with developments in procedural law theory and institutional frameworks; it abandons indirect control over legislative power in the realm of substantive law and is incapable of responding to the challenges and erosion posed by security-oriented and preventive criminal legislation and policies. The introduction of the substantive connotation of the presumption of innocence highlights the principle's constitutional status and its nature as a fundamental right, aligning with the requirements of substantive rule of law and the integration of criminal justice. The substantive connotation addresses the blind spots of the formal connotation by extending the normative force of the presumption of innocence to areas such as sentencing and the disposal of property involved in cases. It assists the principle of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) in fulfilling the dual requirements of substantive appropriateness and justice in defining the scope of crimes, allocating the burden of proof, establishing presumptions and defenses, and defining subjective elements. Restrictions on the presumption of innocence should be subject to constitutional review through the principle of proportionality and its doctrinal system, particularly by maintaining a balance between the importance of the disputed issues and the defendant's right to defense at the level of the narrow proportionality test, so as to evaluate and justify whether contested provisions constitute reasonable limitations on the presumption of innocence. |