論我國金融消費者保護專責機構之建立——以美國金融消費者保護局為例

A Proposal for the Establishment of a Financial Consumer Protection Authority in Taiwan: The U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as a Model

本文旨在以美國之金融消費者保護局為對象，重新檢討我國金融監理與金融消費者保護之架構，並分析成立金融消費者保護專責機構之可行性。過去，多數見解倡議金融監理一元化，然在金融危機之後，此趨勢已有重大改變，英美也特別強調市場行為之監理與金融消費者之保護。相較之下，我國之金融監理體系從金管會成立後就維持一元化之架構，常有監理目標之衝突，且金融消費評議中心僅著重於評議案件與金融教育宣導等事項，亦可見金融消費法規與政策往往欠缺統一規劃。因此，本文先從金融監理與消費者保護法制之架構談起，探討美國金融消費者保護局之發展，介紹其設計、機制及相關爭議，再論述我國目前之問題。就結論而言，本文認為我國可以參考美國，建立專責之金融消費者保護局，以區分審慎與行為監理，避免監理目標之衝突。並可賦予職權與預算之獨立性，統整相關法規以避免適用衝突，提升資訊公開與透明性，強化資料蒐集等權力，以進一步強化金融消費者之保護。

This article aims to reexamine the structure of financial supervision and consumer protection in Taiwan, with particular reference to the United States' Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and to analyze the feasibility of establishing a dedicated financial consumer protection authority. Historically, mainstream opinion advocated for the unification of financial supervision. However, following the global financial crisis, this trend has undergone significant change, with the United Kingdom and the United States placing special emphasis on market conduct supervision and the protection of financial consumers. In contrast, Taiwan's financial supervisory system has maintained a unified structure since the establishment of the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), often resulting in conflicts between supervisory objectives. Furthermore, the Financial Ombudsman Institution has primarily focused on dispute resolution and financial education, leading to fragmented regulatory frameworks and policies without unified planning.
Accordingly, this article first examines the structure of financial supervision and consumer protection regimes, explores the development of the CFPB, introduces its design, mechanisms, and related controversies, and then discusses the current issues facing Taiwan. In conclusion, this article argues that Taiwan should consider establishing a dedicated Financial Consumer Protection Bureau, modeled on the U.S. experience, to distinguish between prudential and conduct supervision and to avoid conflicts between regulatory objectives. Such a bureau should be granted operational independence, sufficient budgetary autonomy, and the authority to consolidate relevant regulations to prevent conflicts of application. It should also enhance information disclosure, transparency, and data collection powers, thereby strengthening the protection of financial consumers.