論刑法上之涵攝錯誤──以故意與不法意識之區分為中心

On Subsumption Errors in Criminal Law: With a Focus on the Distinction Between Intent and Awareness of Wrongfulness

本文旨在釐清構成要件錯誤與禁止錯誤之區別基準，並檢討現行通說所採之「外行人平行評價」是否足以作為錯誤類型之判斷依據。通說主張，故意的認知對象為外行人可理解之社會意義，故誤認社會意義者，即屬構成要件錯誤。惟此標準未能清楚說明故意之規範基礎，亦與故意作為「實現構成要件之知與欲」的定義及其訴求機能有所齟齬。此外，「制度性事實」與「刑法以外之法律錯誤」之學說，實已導致故意對象的去規範化，與通說對故意之理解明顯不符。本文主張，涵攝概念本身蘊含行為人對法規範之理解與適用，應作為分析訴求機能與主觀認知之起點。基此，本文從涵攝角度重新詮釋故意之認知結構，並結合罪責理論，分析不同構成要件類型（如空白刑法條文、評價性要件）在故意判斷上所引發之適用困難。除檢討德國相關理論與實務發展外，亦納入我國學說與裁判資料，指出現行法下，錯誤之區分標準與禁止錯誤的責任判斷仍有待細緻化之處。本文進一步提出，應根據行為人對事實、規範及其涵攝關係之不同錯誤型態，調整錯誤之責任評價。透過此一嘗試，期能為實質故意責任之建構提供更具解釋力與體系一致性的說明框架。

This article aims to clarify the criteria for distinguishing between mistakes of elements (Tatbestandsirrtum) and mistakes of prohibition (Verbotsirrtum), and to critically examine whether the widely accepted standard of“layperson’s parallel evaluation”can serve as a reliable basis for such classification. According to the prevailing view, the object of intent is the social meaning of the conduct as understood by a layperson, such that errors concerning social meaning—rather than legal meaning—are classified as mistakes of elements. However, this standard fails to adequately explain the normative foundation of intent and contradicts the conceptualization of intent as the“knowledge and will to realize the statutory elements,”as well as its normative appeal function. Moreover, doctrinal approaches to“institutional facts”and“errors regarding non-criminal legal norms”have, in practice, led to the de-normativization of the object of intent, diverging from prevailing understandings of intent in criminal law. This article argues that the concept of subsumption inherently involves the actor’s understanding and application of legal norms, and should therefore serve as the analytical starting point for assessing both the normative appeal function and the actor’s subjective awareness. Building on this perspective, the article reinterprets the cognitive structure of intent through the lens of subsumption and integrates this with the theory of culpability. It further analyzes the challenges posed by different types of statutory elements—such as blank criminal provisions and evaluative elements—in the determination of intent. In addition to reviewing relevant German theories, the article incorporates Taiwanese doctrinal debates and judicial decisions, highlighting the need for greater conceptual precision in the classification of errors and in the assessment of liability under mistakes of prohibition. It ultimately proposes that different error types—concerning facts, norms, and the act of subsumption itself—should be analytically distinguished, and that the structure of intent and the scope of awareness of unlawfulness should be adjusted accordingly. Through this approach, the article seeks to contribute a more coherent and normatively grounded framework for the construction of substantial intent-based responsibility.