消費者保護法之產品警告、指示上瑕疵認定──以美國法為借鑑

Defects in Product Warnings and Instructions under the Consumer Protection Act: Insights from US Law

我國消費者保護法第7條第2項乃產品警告瑕疵之規定，依其文義，只要產品未在明顯處針對個案引發消費者損害之危險予以警告，即有警告瑕疵；反之，如已於明顯處附加警告，似即無警告瑕疵。然而，此歸責模式實過於僵硬。我國學說及法院見解針對特定類型之危險應否警告，已有相關見解可資參照；此外，學說上亦進一步討論，在已提供警告之情形下，是否及如何仍可能構成警告瑕疵。
美國法上，有以成本（風險）效益分析判斷警告瑕疵之觀點，認為每添加一則警告，即可能轉移對既存警告資訊之注意，故須考慮添加一則警告對整體警告資訊之傳達效果影響。此種成本效益分析亦成為美國法上針對特定危險類型認為無庸警告之理由。再者，在美國法上，已提供警告時，仍可能因警告不適當構成警告瑕疵，此與警告資訊呈現方式有關，亦涉及成本效益分析。
本文認為，成本效益分析觀點使吾人認識提供警告本身隱含之代價，但其較適合被用來判斷警告呈現方式之適當性，而較難作為根本否定或承認警告義務之理由。就特定危害應否警告，仍應取決於一般消費者是否須仰賴警告避免危害。另外，由於消費者有無濫用產品，實質上與警告瑕疵之判斷難以區別，故本文主張，當產品責任訴訟涉及警告瑕疵時，不必再另外探討產品濫用。

Article 7, Paragraph 2 of Taiwan’s Consumer Protection Act governs defective product warnings. Under a literal reading of the provision, a product has a warning defect whenever it fails to provide, in a conspicuous place, a warning against the risk that caused injury to consumers or damage to their property. Conversely, if such a warning is provided in a conspicuous place, there would appear to be no warning defect. However, this model of liability is overly rigid. Taiwanese courts and legal scholars have developed theories on whether warnings are required for certain types of risks. Scholars have also examined whether, and how, a warning defect may still exist even when a warning has been provided.
Under US law, some scholars and courts apply a cost-benefit (or risk-utility) analysis to warning defects. This approach recognizes that each additional warning may divert attention from existing warnings and, therefore, requires weighing how an additional warning would affect the overall effectiveness of risk communication. In US law, cost-benefit analysis has also been used to support the conclusion that warnings are unnecessary for certain types of risks. Moreover, under US law, a warning defect may still exist even when a warning is given if the warning is inadequate. Whether a warning is adequate depends on how the warning is presented, and the adequacy analysis also involves cost-benefit considerations.
This article argues that although cost-benefit analysis illuminates the inherent trade-offs involved in providing warnings, it is better suited to evaluating the adequacy of a warning’s presentation than to deciding whether a duty to warn should exist in the first place. Whether a warning is required for a particular risk should ultimately depend on whether the average consumer would need the warning to avoid harm. Finally, because the issue of product misuse is difficult to separate from the warning-defect analysis, this article contends that misuse need not be treated as a separate inquiry in product liability cases involving warning defects.