以情理合一論孔子之倫理思想——對當代孔子研究的反思與重構

Confucius’Ethical Thought as a Unity of Feelings and Reason: A Reflection on and Reconstruction of Contemporary Confucian Studies

當代藉西方倫理學對儒學之詮釋主要有兩個方向：其一、是由余紀元依亞里士多德德行論之詮釋，另一為更早的，由牟宗三依康德義務論之詮釋。余氏之詮釋失於把孔子推到漢儒以宜析義之傳統，勞思光以正當析義可解決這問題。與N. Noddings把情感置於規範之先相反，勞氏卻在貶抑情感中詮釋儒學；二者皆無法完整說明義務之概念，因勞氏之說使規範無力，N. Noddings則使情感無方向。牟宗三之儒學義務論詮釋卻能在其情理統一中說明這概念；藉孔子這統一之概念可揭示出一人性之概念，它非亞里士多德所言人之間的共同特徵，由此即可證H. Fingarette拒絕孔子之道德主體之概念是錯誤的。

The contemporary interpretations of Confucianism through western ethics have mainly two directions: the one is the interpretation of Aristotle’s virtue doctrine constructed by Yu Jiyuan,（余紀元）and the other is the earlier interpretation of Kant’s deontology constructed by Mou Zongsan（牟宗三）. Yu’s interpretation fails in pushing Confucius back to the Han tradition to explain Yi through suitability. Lao Siguang（勞思光）solves this problem by explaining Yi through legitimacy as a norm. Contrary to N. Noddings who puts emotion before reason, Lao Siguang interprets Confucianism by devaluing emotion. Neither of them can explain the concept of moral responsibility, because the latter makes a norm powerless, while the former makes emotion directionless. However, Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of Confucian deontology can solve this moral concept in his unity of emotion and norm, the concept of moral autonomy by Mou expresses the Confucian understanding of human moral nature. However, these concepts originated from Confucius rather than Mencius mentioned by Mou. This paper rediscovers Confucius’s contribution in this regard, which human nature is not an Aristotle’s common characteristic mentioned by Yu Jiyuan, but is understood as a concept of autonomous action defined through a feeling of respect, human being is the subject of this action.