銀行董事會多元化對盈餘管理的影響

THE IMPACT OF BANK BOARD DIVERSITY ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT

本文檢視銀行董事會多元化對盈餘管理的影響，以裁決性呆帳提列（DLLP）和備供出售金融資產已實現損益（RGL）衡量盈餘管理。2009至2022年本國及部分外商銀行資料迴歸結果指出董事會多元化可抑制次年向上盈餘管理，故多元化增進公司治理；DLLP降低是因董監事專業、職業及性別多元化；RGL減少主由學歷和性別多元化，故性別多元化效益佳。董事會多元化效果在公營銀行比金控子銀行及外商銀子行差，可能與其有政府控制及特殊政策任務有關。由董事會多元程度之變動分析，確認多元化產生抑制效果。另發現董事會多元化也減少避險及交易目的衍生性交易的盈餘管理；但只有DLLP負向影響交易目的衍生性交易，其他工具間均無互動。本文豐富銀行管理、公司治理及盈餘品質等文獻內涵。

This paper examines the impact of bank board diversity on earnings management (EM), using discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) and realized gains and losses on financial assets available for sale (RGL) to measure EM. Using a sample of domestic and foreign banks from 2009 to 2022, the results indicate that board diversity can constrain upward EM in the next year, so board diversity can enhance corporate governance. This paper also finds that decreasing DLLP is due to the professionalism, occupation and gender diversities of directors; RGL reduction is mainly caused by directors’educational background and gender diversity, so the latter has benefits. The effect of board diversity is worse in state-owned banks than in both financial holding and foreign bank subsidiaries. This is likely related to the state-owned banks facing government controls and special policy tasks. Analysis of changes in the degree of board diversity confirms that diversity has a suppressive effect on EM. Also, board diversity reduces EM by hedging- and trading-purpose trading of derivative financial products. However, only DLLP negatively affects trading-purpose derivatives, and there is no interaction between other EM instruments. This article enriches the literature on bank management, corporate governance and earnings quality.