競業禁止條款與企業社會責任之關聯性：高階經理人任期之調節效果

Non-Compete Agreements and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Effect of CEO Tenure

本研究主要探討美國各州競業禁止條款（non-compete agreements, NCAs）執行程度不一與該州公司企業社會責任（corporate social responsibility, CSR）參與之關聯性。與過去文獻一致，本研究的實證結果顯示州政府NCAs執行程度較嚴時會導致企業投入較少的CSR，此結果支持公司挽留員工的動機會影響其參與CSR的論點。但更重要的是，我們發現高階經理人（CEO）的任期會影響NCAs執行強度與CSR參與間的負向關係，亦即，任期較長的CEO會減弱上述的負向關係。也就是說，在執行較嚴格的NCAs之下，相對於任期較短的CEO，任期較長的CEO較不會減少投入CSR。本研究指出，雖然執行嚴格的NCAs會減少公司對於員工留任的擔憂，但同時也會降低公司投入CSR的動機，然而公司若有任期較長的CEO，則會減弱其降低投入CSR的動機。

In this study, we examine the relationship between the enforceability of non-compete agreements (NCAs) across U.S. states and firms’corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement. Consistent with the prior literature, we document that stricter state-level enforcement of NCAs leads to lower CSR engagement, supporting the argument that firms’incentive to retain employees affects their CSR engagement. More importantly, we find that the negative relation between NCA enforceability and CSR engagement varies with CEO tenure. Specifically, longer CEO tenure weakens the negative association. That is, under stricter NCA enforcement, firms with longer-tenured CEOs are less likely to reduce their CSR activities compared to firms with shorter-tenured CEOs. Overall, our finding supports the conjecture that although stricter NCAs reduce firms’incentive to engage in CSR activities by decreasing concerns about employee retention, the stronger incentive to retain their longer-tenured CEOs mitigates firms’incentives to reduce their CSR activities.