| 英文摘要 |
In financial and economic regulatory law, acts that cause damage to the principal by breaching one’s official duties are subject to aggravated punishment compared to the ordinary offense of breach of trust; such offenses are collectively referred to as special breach of trust offenses. Conventional interpretations of special breach of trust offenses are generally derived from the framework of the ordinary breach of trust offense under the Criminal Code of the Republic of China. However, given that the statutory penalties for special breach of trust offenses are significantly more severe, it is open to question whether they should automatically be interpreted in the same manner. Using Supreme Court Criminal Judgment No. 216 of 2024 (Tai- Shang) as a starting point, this article reexamines the prevailing interpretive approach through an analysis of the Court’s reasoning. It argues that the legally protected good of special breach of trust offenses differ from the principal’s property interests protected by the ordinary breach of trust offense. Accordingly, even where the two offenses share identical statutory language, they should be interpreted distinctly in light of their respective legally protected good. On this basis,“official duties”should be distinguished from their counterpart in the ordinary breach of trust and confined to obligations imposed on specific positions by individual statutes and regulations, as well as by authorized administrative orders, interpretive letters issued by competent bank-supervision authorities, or internal banking rules. Likewise,“property damage”should be limited to adverse changes in financial conditions that are capable of disrupting the financial market, and should not be broadly construed to include all benefits that ought to have accrued but did not. |