論Auer Deference在Kisor案後之發展與美國行政國家權力分立問題

Auer Deference in the Post-Kisor Era and Its Implications for the Separation of Powers in the U.S. Administrative State

司法謙讓原則是美國行政法中備受矚目之議題，其中又以Auer deference時常為人詬病有違反憲法權力分立之嫌，而後出現的Kisor v. Wilkie案（下稱Kisor案）則被認為是用以限制Auer deference機械式謙讓的重要案件。然Kisor案是否真的起到牽制作用仍待證實。至於Auer deference的爭議主要圍繞在「解釋行政命令模糊之處」本身究竟係屬法律問題，還是政策決定的一環？對此，美國憲法並未給予明確解答，而作為同是牽涉自身權力行使範圍的法院，似乎掌握決定司法與行政邊界的話語權，此不免讓人好奇法院在論證上是否能保持超然獨立之立場。在對於司法謙讓爭議已陷入正、反方互不相讓的爭論僵局，本文認為藉由實證法院如何適用司法謙讓原則，或許能帶來更深層次之討論。本文以美國聯邦法院在Kisor案後的Auer deference適用案件作為實證對象，發現Kisor案已被法院操作成易於拒絕謙讓的工具，且在論述過程中呈現出司法偏見。儘管Kisor案確實在結果上限縮Auer deference適用空間，但從實證結果可知，法規確實會留有模糊空間，須有人進行填補。至於該如何解決此問題，本文認為以最大化公共效益為宗旨，即能確立行政與司法機關在司法謙讓議題的角色定位。最後，本文也嘗試分析Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo案（近期推翻Chevron deference）與其可能對Auer deference產生之影響，期望提供更多有利於司法謙讓討論之觀點。

Judicial deference remains a critical issue in U.S. administrative law, with Auer deference often criticized for potentially violating the principles of separation of powers. To prevent courts from mechanically differencing to agency interpretations, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie (hereinafter the Kisor case) established criteria to constrain the use of Auer deference. However, the effect of the Kisor case is still unfolding. The main controversy around Auer deference lies in whether“resolving regulatory ambiguities”constitutes a question of law or is part of policy decision-making. This question has yet to be answered by the Constitution in the U.S., but courts, as stakeholders, hold the authority to define the boundaries between judicial and administrative power. The question arises about whether courts can remain neutral and independent when deciding deferential issues. With an eye to the polarized debate on judicial deference, this article suggests an empirical approach to examining the actual application of deference principles in the courts to help move the debate forward. The article analyzed the cases that invoked Auer deference and were decided by Federal courts after the Kisor case, finding that the courts have increasingly utilized the Kisor case as a framework to reject deference. In addition, judicial bias could be found in the reasoning of these cases. While the Kisor case has indeed limited the application of Auer deference, empirical results show that gaps do exist in statutes, necessitating further interpretation. To address these gaps, the article believes that the principle of maximizing public benefit can help clarify the roles of agencies and courts. Lastly, the article also examines the recent decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (which overruled Chevron deference) and its potential implications for Auer deference, aiming to offer further insights into the ongoing debate on judicial deference.