網路平台的組合定價與品質差異

Composite Pricing and Quality Differentiation of Internet Platform

本研究旨在探討網路服務平台廠商(ISP)提升高品質和低品質內容提供者(CP)的品質研發。我們建立一個Hotelling模型，其中獨占ISP廠商提供網路服務平台於兩家分別為高品質以及低品質的內容服務供應商和消費者。我們證明平台的差異或受監管（單一）品質研發對組合定價、兩CP廠商利潤、消費者剩餘和社會福利至關重要。研究結果顯示，在覆蓋市場中，低品質CP和高品質CP在透過單一品質提升的研發(R&D)下利潤較高。然而，與單一品質研發相比，差異性研發對ISP廠商利潤、消費者剩餘和社會福利更有利。我們也將分析擴展到未覆蓋市場，結果顯示消費者剩餘和社會福利仍然在差異性研發下較高，但低品質CP廠商利潤轉而提高，而ISP廠商和高品質CP廠商的利潤並不明確。我們也延伸探討ISP和CP之間的議價力如何影響品質研發、定價策略和社會福利，並證明我們的主要結果在存在議價力下仍然成立。

This research considers the incentive of Internet service providers (ISPs) to upgrade the delivery quality of high- and low-quality content providers (CPs). Building a Hotelling model where a monopolistic ISP interacts with two mobile service providers and consumers through an ISP, we demonstrate that discriminatory or regulated (uniform) quality upgrades as the platform critically affects composite pricing, CP surplus, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Findings show that a low-quality CP and a high-quality CP are always better off with uniform research and development (R&D) in a covered market. However, the ISP, consumer surplus, and social welfare are always better off with discriminatory R&D versus uniform R&D. Our analysis extends to an uncovered market, showing that a low-quality CP, consumer surplus, and social welfare are always better off with discriminatory R&D, but the profits of the ISP and high-quality CP are ambiguous. We also examine how the bargaining power between the ISP and CPs influences quality packages, pricing strategies, and social welfare. Our main results remain valid even when incorporating the bargaining power between the ISP and CPs.