| 英文摘要 |
As the world's first trade regulatory measure related to climate, the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a pivotal institutional design for realizing the ''European Green Deal''. It aims to achieve ambitious emission reduction targets and prevent carbon leakage risks, advance global climate regulation through unilateral actions, and promote the compatibility of climate standards with trade rules. It also seeks to eliminate free allowances, narrow the carbon price gaps between EU carbon markets and the carbon cost gap between EU and non-EU enterprises, thereby maintaining the EU carbon market's green competitive advantage. Furthermore, it aims to strengthen the EU's voice in climate governance by applying unilateral climate regulatory measures extraterritorially to facilitate multilateral climate regulation, enabling the extraterritorial diffusion of the EU's paradigm and standards for trade-related carbon accounting and pricing, forming a global carbon system centered on the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), and ultimately fostering a global climate governance order driven by a dual-wheel approach of ''carbon market + carbon tariff''. As an alternative to free allowances and a controversial unilateral measure, the implementation of the CBAM will synchronize the EU's uniform accounting standards and carbon pricing system with imported products originating from different countries with varied characteristics, potentially violating the principles of ''common but differentiated responsibilities'' and ''respective capabilities'' in climate governance, the National Treatment and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment in the WTO, and the EU's tariff concessions commitments under the WTO. It is also difficult to invoke the GATT health and environment exception clauses to justify its legality. China and the EU are mutually important trade partners. Currently, the absolute value of China's exports of products covered by the EU's CBAM is relatively large, but the overall proportion is relatively small. During the transition period, CBAM will have limited impact on China. However, as the scope of CBAM continues to expand and EU carbon prices continue to soar, and given the significant gap between the industry scope and carbon price incentives covered by China's carbon market and the ETS, the inhibitory impact of CBAM on China's future exports to the EU will increasingly grow, posing medium- to long-term challenges that cannot be underestimated. Therefore, as the EU's largest trading partner, China must plan ahead at the national level and devise specific measures to address CBAM. Firstly, in the long term, China can gradually increase domestic carbon prices or impose carbon taxes to narrow the carbon price gap with the ETS. Secondly, China should fully utilize the WTO dispute settlement mechanism by submitting disputes between China and the EU concerning CBAM to the WTO panel procedure and initiating the appellate arbitration procedure under the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) to safeguard the rights and interests of Chinese export enterprises. Thirdly, China should strengthen coordination and cooperation with the EU, explore ways to link the Chinese and EU carbon markets, actively participate in negotiations on the EU Climate Club, and strive to become a founding member. Finally, leveraging the broad consensus and influence gained through the Belt and Road Initiative, China should advocate for the establishment of a ''Belt and Road'' regional carbon trading common market with the ''RMB'' as the core settlement currency, mitigate the impact of CBAM on trade among countries along the Belt and Road, and enhance competitiveness with European and American climate governance. Through the above measures, the long-term impact of CBAM on international trade pattern can be minimized. |