| 英文摘要 |
In recent years, Chinese capital has actively acquired land surrounding Japan’s Self-Defense Force bases, nuclear facilities, and remote border islands, raising significant national security concerns. These investments have moved beyond the realm of economic activity and have increasingly become channels for grayzone infiltration and intelligence operations, transforming land from a commercial asset into a geopolitical tool that affects military readiness, political autonomy, and institutional security. In 2021, Japan enacted the Act on the Review and Regulation of the Use of Real Estate Surrounding Important Facilities and on Remote Territorial Islands to place such transactions under regulatory scrutiny. However, the framework remains predominantly ex post, lacking prior review mechanisms and effective interagency coordination, thereby limiting its preventive capacity. Employing a comparative analytical approach, this study examines the U.S.’s CFIUS, Australia’s FIRB, and Japan’s land security framework to identify how the Japan’s legal culture and administrative architecture are the structural sources of Japan’s delayed institutional response. The findings suggest that democracies must develop forwardlooking, transparent, and well-integrated regulatory mechanisms that balance market openness with national security in order to enhance institutional resilience against gray-zone activities. |