墨家兼愛與儒家仁愛之比較——以儒家仁愛為探究路徑

A Comparison of Mohist Jian Ai and Confucian Ren Ai: An Inquiry Centered on Confucian Rene

本文聚焦於墨家核心思想兼愛，與儒家核心思想仁愛的比較，儒墨之衝突是先秦思想的重點之一，墨家與儒家互有批評，然而韓愈卻對墨家與儒家做出「不相用，不足為孔墨」的說明，可見兩者不是絕對的相反。事實上，儒墨兩家之思想有諸多相似之處，兩者的理想目標甚至相同，都是追求天下安寧相愛相助的大同世界，但因兩者核心理論相去甚遠，故產生衝突。
墨家兼愛的基礎理論是「愛人若愛其身」，其根源於天志，且是天志的要求。墨子透過天志、義、利等外在因素，促使人們有行兼愛之可能，兼愛遍及天下之人，包含自己；兼愛思想以取得天下之公利為主要目標，同時利也是兼愛行動之價值所在。儒家仁愛則是聚焦於仁心之發用，愛人是仁心的表現之一，此仁心人所本有，不需透過外在因素使其發用，它本身即具有決斷與行動之能力，並且人人皆有此心與行仁愛之能力。仁愛行動的價值在於人之存心，行動是否有達成目標不是主要價值，而仁心是由自己出發，擴展到他人乃至天下萬物上，因此仁人之個人追求是「贊天地之化育」。可見兼愛與仁愛在本質上大相逕庭，兼愛之動力均由外而來，行動的價值與目標有絕對的關聯；仁愛之動力則由本心所發，不假外求，行動價值在於人之存心，而非目標。另外，雖然雙方想法均有現實實現的困難，但兼愛缺少了絕對的普遍性，因此兼愛行動於理論上也無法完整實現；仁愛之心則是出於理性的絕對普遍之心，故理論上仁愛行動具有實現的可能。

This article offers a comparative study of the Mohist doctrine of jian ai (impartial or universal care) and the Confucian concept of ren ai (benevolent love). The Confucian–Mohist debate is a key theme in pre-Qin intellectual history. Although the two schools criticized one another, Han Yu’s remark that they“are not mutually applicable, yet insufficient to negate either Confucius or Mozi”indicates that their relationship cannot be reduced to a simple binary opposition. In practice, both traditions converge on an overarching ethical horizon: the pursuit of a peaceful world marked by mutual care, cooperation, and social harmony. The conflicts between them arise from deep differences in their core theoretical premises.
Mohist jian ai is grounded in the maxim“love others as one loves oneself,”justified through the Will of Heaven (tian zhi) and treated as a normative requirement. Mozi mobilizes external justificatory factors—Heaven’s will, righteousness, and benefit—to motivate the realization of impartial care across the entire world, encompassing all persons, including oneself. Within this framework, the attainment of public benefit (gong li) serves as the primary aim of moral practice, and“benefit”also functions as a central criterion for evaluating the value of moral action.
Confucian ren ai, by contrast, centers on the activation and expression of the innate ren-heart. Loving others is one manifestation of this inborn moral capacity, which all humans possess and which does not require external inducement to become effective. The ren-heart contains intrinsic judgment and agency; accordingly, the value of benevolent action lies chiefly in moral intention and the quality of one’s inward disposition, rather than in whether external objectives are fully achieved. From the self, ren extends outward to others and ultimately to the myriad beings, culminating in the ideal of“assisting the transformative processes of Heaven and Earth.”
These differences disclose distinct structures of moral motivation and valuation. Jian ai depends on externally grounded imperatives and links the worth of action closely to its goals, while ren ai originates in inner moral consciousness and locates value in ethical intention. Both ideals face difficulties in practical implementation; however, jian ai is argued to lack absolute universality and therefore encounters theoretical limits on full realization, whereas ren ai, grounded in a universally shared rational moral capacity, retains theoretical coherence and the possibility of realization.