公司股東會減資、增資決議後之公司法第245條第1項之少數股東權保護

Protection of Minority Shareholder Rights under Article 245, Paragraph 1 of the Company Act following Capital Reduction and Capital Increase Resolutions by the Shareholders' Meeting

本文作者以實際承辦案件，探討我國公司法第245條第1項之少數股東權，於少數股東向法院聲請選任股份有限公司檢查人後，經公司進行減資、增資決議致少數股東之股權比例遭稀釋，低於公司法第245條第1項之法定持股比例要求，而於法院選任檢查人程序中，是否應要求少數股東於裁定時仍應維持法定比例股份之爭議，迄今公司法實務與學說，尚無定論。
目前多數意見採肯定說，認為股份有限公司之少數股東依公司法第245條第1項聲請選任公司檢查人時，需聲請時至裁定時均符合其法定持股比例，方符合程序權利保護要件。然而，少數說及本文認為，對照德國股份法，我國並無將少數股東需於選任程序之裁定時亦應需持有法定持股比例列為明文要件，且由公司法第245條立法歷程及法條文字以觀，併從肯定說據此推導出所謂「需於裁定時亦持有法定持股比例」之立法立意，肯定說顯然加諸人民法所無之限制，將使股份有限公司經營派恐利用減、增資手段刻意規避少數股東請求選任檢查人程序，使少數股東權益受損、影響公司甚鉅，而認為現行法應以「聲請時」持有法定持股比例即為已足，該當公司法第245條第1項少數股東聲請法院選任股份有限公司檢查人之要件，以符合立法者保障少數股東權之初衷。
而就公司法第245條第1項少數股東究竟應於聲請時亦或至裁定時需持有法定持股比例之判斷，法院見解目前仍有歧異，莫衷一是，實待修法弭平其爭議。

Through practical experience, the author explores minority shareholders' rights under Article 245, Paragraph 1 of the Taiwan Company Act. Specifically, this paper examines whether, after a minority shareholder applies to the court to appoint an inspector for a corporation, the subsequent capital increase or reduction, which dilutes the minority shareholder's equity below the statutory threshold required by Article 245, Paragraph 1, should mandate that the minority shareholder continue to hold the statutory proportion of shares at the time of the court's decision. This question remains unsolved.
The prevailing opinion supports the affirmative stance, holding that minority shareholders in a corporation who petition for the appointment of an inspector under Article 245, Paragraph 1 must meet with the statutory shareholding requirement continuously from the time of filing to the court’s decision to satisfy procedural rights protection. However, the minority view, supported by this paper, contends that, in contrast to German corporate law, Taiwan law does not explicitly require minority shareholders to maintain the statutory shareholding ratio at the time of the court’s ruling. Observing from the legislative history and text of said Article 245, the affirmative stance imposes an additional restriction not stipulated in law. This requirement might enable controlling shareholders to exploit capital adjustments as a means to circumvent minority shareholders’rights to request the appointment of an inspector, potentially harming minority interests and significantly impacting corporate governance. Therefore, this paper argues that compliance with Article 245, Paragraph 1’s threshold should be assessed based on the shareholding ratio at the time of filing, aligning with the legislature’s intent to protect minority shareholders’rights.
At present, judicial interpretations regarding whether minority shareholders must hold the statutory shareholding ratio at the time of filing or at the time of decision under the above-referred Article 245, Paragraph 1 remain inconsistent, highlighting the needs for further legislative clarification.