| 英文摘要 |
This article examines the perceptions and responses of the Johnson administration during the“Prague Spring”in 1968 and analyzes its decision-making process. Using the Rational Actor Model as the primary analytical framework, this article explores how key U.S. policymakers reacted to the Soviet Union’s military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The decision not intervene militarily was not a diplomatic failure but a calculated strategic choice based on rational assessment. Confronted with a Soviet-led operation amid the height of the Vietnam War and growing domestic political pressure, President Johnson aimed to address the Prague Spring crisis through the U.N. while avoiding direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. Drawing upon The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series and primary sources from key policymakers—including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Advisor Walt , this article demonstrates the administration’s internal consensus and consistency in pursuing the Détente policy. The Rational Actor Model effectively explains the Johnson administration’s limited response during the Prague Spring, reflecting strategic calculations of coexistence and competition with the Soviet Union within the Cold War context. The article has found that the administration’s passive, noninterventionist stance stemmed from the belief among key decision-makers that the risks of intervention outweighed the potential gains and thus ran counter to U.S. national interests. |