權力分享與解決比利時族群衝突的選舉制度設計

Power Sharing and Electoral Arrangements for Managing Ethnic Conflict in Belgium

比利時魯汶大學兩位教授認為該國選舉制度的缺失，是造成其分裂社會難以治理的主因之一。他們提出具想像力與創造力構想，透過選舉制度的些微調整改變，嘗試使比利時的聯邦及協和體制運作順暢；它同時能符合向心主義與協和主義學派的精神。該構想是創造一個以全國為範圍的選區，不同族群有固定比例名額，並以支持比利時完整性為特色；希望選出的政治人物能夠以比利時聯邦利益為考量，同時仍維持荷、法語族群之間的平等與比例性。本文除了介紹該選舉制度的設計內涵外，並分析（自利的）選舉誘因、不確定性與程序性的障礙因素，如何影響選舉制度變遷的可能性。

Kris Deschouwer and Philippe Van Parijs argue the shortcoming of the Belgian electoral system is one of the major problems for a divided society to be smoothly governed. They provide an imaginative proposal to make Belgium’s federal and consociational arrangements work better through a slight change of the country’s electoral system. Their proposal arguably matches the ethos of both the consociational and centripetalist schools. The core idea is to create a countrywide electoral district of seats with a pan-Belgian character but with internal quotas of speakers. The goal is to generate more politicians who will look to the interests of the federation as a whole while preserving parity and proportionality principles among Flemings and Walloons. In this article we describe Deschouwer and Van Parijs’s design of the electoral system. This paper also presents an analysis how electoral incentives (self-interest), uncertainty, and procedural barriers affect the likelihood of electoral system change.