歐盟《外國補貼條例》的執法裁量權：規則特徵、合法性風險與中國應對

Enforcement Discretion under EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation: Regulatory Features, Legitimacy Risk and China's Strategy

作為全球範圍內首項規制外國政府補貼本土經濟活動的立法措施，《外國補貼條例》不僅在規制範圍上呈現由貨物貿易向投資並購等多元國際經濟活動擴展的趨勢，還在執法裁量權上表現出一系列新特徵。該條例通過補貼行為的泛歸因性、因果關係的模糊性、救濟措施的靈活性以及依職權調查的主動性等特徵，使歐盟執法機構獲得了相較於《SCM協定》和歐盟國家援助制度更大的執法裁量權。此種基於立法授權的執法裁量權在實踐中或將違反世界貿易組織《服務貿易總協定》的國民待遇、最惠國待遇及市場准入等條款。《外國補貼條例》執法裁量權的擴張將對中國產生一系列負面影響，中國企業與政府應各自做好補貼信息與合規管理的預防性措施，在遭遇執法裁量權濫用的不公正待遇時，可從企業層面的法律訴訟及國家層面的爭端解決機制尋求救濟。

As the first legislation worldwide against foreign government subsidies in local economic activities, the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) not only extends the regulatory scope from trade in goods to various international economic activities including concentration and public procurement, but also gains new features in its enforcement discretion. These new features include“pan-attribution”of subsidization, ambiguity of causal relations, flexibility of redressive measures and ex officio initiation of market investigation, which grant EU Commission with greater enforcement discretion than the SCM Agreement and the EU state aid regime. This enforcement discretion granted by legislation, if abused, is likely to violate the provisions of national treatment, most-favored nation treatment and market access under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The expansion of FSR enforcement discretion could especially generate negative impact on China. Chinese companies and the government should respectively take preventive measures in terms of subsidy information and compliance management. In the event of unfair treatment caused by abuse of enforcement discretion, remedies may be sought from local judicial remedies at the enterprise level as well as from dispute settlement mechanisms at the national level.