| 英文摘要 |
Modern company law regards shareholder’s right protection as its core legislative goal, but equity protection needs to be achieved through control regulations. The widespread existence of corporate control indicates that“control interests”constitute an implicit incentive, and control relationships have a dual impact on corporate governance. The traditional legislation that adopts a regulatory strategy of“mandatory prohibition and post accountability”for the pursuit of“control and personal gain”is inefficient. Especially due to the lack of positive guidance, there is a clear institutional imbalance. The new Company Law demonstrates the orientation of balancing and regulating corporate control, expanding and adjusting the institutional functions of the Company Law for legislative purposes, meeting the control needs of controllers through diversified equity allocation, enhancing the effectiveness of corporate governance through flexible organizational structures, and ensuring the appropriateness of control behavior through a comprehensive accountability mechanism. In the future, control should be further transformed from facts to rights, its identification rules and power system should be improved, the limits of judicial intervention in commerce should be clarified to achieve prudent accountability, and attention should be paid to the use of procedural regulatory strategies. |