歐盟Google Shopping案與自我偏好行為──以事業支配地位之濫用類型為中心

EU Google Shopping Case and Self-Preferencing Behaviors: Focusing on the Typology of Abuse of Dominant Positions

歐盟Google Shopping案引起了全球的廣泛關注，惟案件中Google的系爭行為難以被歐洲聯盟運作條約（Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU）第102條之特定支配地位濫用類型所規制，不論是拒絕交易（refusal to supply）與關鍵設施原則、差別待遇（discrimination, difference in treatment）抑或搭售（tying and bundling），均無法全然契合。面對競爭法適用上的窘境，學界普遍認為歐盟在Google Shopping案事實上構築並明晰了TFEU第102條下之另類違法行為類型──自我偏好（self-preferencing）。由於自我偏好行為可能同時對市場競爭產生積極效果與限制競爭之不利益，其違法性判斷宜依循TFEU第102條一貫採取之合理原則，由執法機關及法院對事業之系爭行為進行個案判斷。整體而言，自我偏好豐富了競爭法具體關注的行為內涵，其與其他支配地位濫用類型在適用上得比照「普通法與特別法」，將自我偏好視為類「概括條款」之「普通法」加以運用。

This paper conducts an in-depth analysis of the Google Shopping case within the European Union, which has garnered widespread global attention. However, the intricacies of the Google Shopping case defy conventional concepts under EU competition law, including refusal to supply, essential facilities doctrine, discrimination, or tying.
Given the limitations of current competition law, scholars consider that the EU actually constructed through the Google Shopping case through a distinct category of antitrust violation named“self-preferencing”to address the distinctive behavior displayed by Google. Due to the dual positive and negative impacts that self-preferencing actions can exert on market competition, encompassing both positive and negative aspects, this paper advocates for the application of“rule of reason”in assessing the legality of self-preferencing, indicating that enforcement authorities and courts should make case-by-case judgments.
In the view of this paper, the concept of self-preferencing enriches the existing categories of antitrust violations under competition law. In addition, self-preferencing should be regarded as a type of“lex generalis”that serves as a“catch-all”provision, similar to how lex generalis and lex specialis normally operate.